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ABSTRACT
ICT projects and institutions in developing countries superimpose in a complex interaction. The acceptance of an ICT project
by various stakeholders and the contribution to economic development are functions of such interaction. In general, a
successful implementation of an ICT project undertaken in a developing country requires significant institutional
adjustments. Drawing upon institutional theories, this paper investigates how regulative, normative and cognitive institutions
in developing countries influence the ICT-economic development nexus. We use a multiple case study research design. The
findings of this paper suggests that the root causes of success or failure of ICT projects are nature of institutional
components such as sanctioning and monitoring power, social norms and cognitive programs of stakeholders. We have
examined interrelationships among orientation of an ICT project (economic elite centered vs. socially disadvantaged group
centered); the nature of institutions and institutional adjustments associated with the project; diffusion pattern of the
technology and resulting contribution to development.
Keywords
Institutions, ICT, economic development, developing countries
INTRODUCTION
Societies differ widely in terms of flexibility and acceptance of technological changes. Success rates as well as contribution
to economic development of ICT projects undertaken in developing countries thus vary widely. Technological changes have
occurred more rapidly in some developing countries than others (Phillips 2000). The sources of such widely disparate paths
of technological change in societies have been very important but highly underresearched subject (North 1990, 6).
Obstacles facing and sources of success of an ICT project in a developing country go far beyond economics. In addition to
the costs, benefits and performance (Franz and Robey 1984), political criteria (Franz and Robey 1984; Markus 1983) and
social factors (Rice and Aydin 1991) influence ICT adoption and implementation as well as outcomes. Put differently,
success of an ICT project is tightly linked to the monitoring and sanctioning powers, social norms and cognitive programs of
various stakeholders.
In this paper, we seek to address the following research questions:
1. What is the nature of institutional factors that interact with an ICT project in a developing country? What are the
mechanisms by which these factors influence the success of the project?
2. How can ICT projects be introduced in developing countries so as to enhance the contribution to economic
development?
We draw upon institutional theories and two case studies to address the above questions. The remainder of the paper is
structured as follows: The next section provides a brief overview of the methodology employed. Then, we review definitions
of the term “economic development”. It is followed by a review of the literatures on institutional theory. Next, we analyze
two cases of ICT projects undertaken in developing countries. Then, we discuss lessons learned from the two cases. Finally,
we provide some discussions.
METHODOLOGY
There is a serious lack of well-defined concepts and theories on ICTs’ interaction with institutions in developing countries.
Qualitative studies are arguably appropriate when phenomena as well as relationship among them are not well understood
(Eisenhardt 1989; Parkhe 1993).
Since the objectives of the study are oriented toward theory development (Glaser and Strauss 1973) rather than theory testing,
we employed a case study methodology— a qualitative approach (Eisenhardt 1989; Parkhe 1993; Yin 1994). By using
analytical rather than statistical logic, case studies help understand complex phenomena (Yin 1994).
 491
Kshetri                                 The Institution-ICT-Economic Development Nexus
Proceedings of the Eleventh Americas Conference on Information Systems, Omaha, NE, USA August 11th – 14th 2005
More specifically, the approach of this paper can be described as interpretive epistemology and multiple case studies to
construct theory (Montealegre 1999; Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991; Yin 1989). A multiple case study design investigates two
or more cases to provide insights into a condition, phenomenon, or population that can be generalized (Stake 1994).
The cases selected in this paper are ICT projects in the Andhra Pradesh State of India and OSS projects in China. These
projects vary widely in terms of institutional setting such as laws, beliefs, norms, rules and conventions as well as economic
factors (Table 1 and 2).
Since diverse institutional factors are embedded in the unit of analysis, primary data collection is time consuming at best and
impossible at worst. Moreover, primary data cannot capture the comprehensive picture of the whole context of ICT
implementation process and impacts on economic development. We thus mainly relied on data from secondary sources. For
one of the projects, however, we conducted semi-structured interviews with policy makers and consumers.
Table 1 and 2 here
ICTS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
The term “economic development” is interpreted differently depending upon the perspectives. The American Economic
Development Council (AEDC) defines economic development as: “The process of creating wealth through the mobilization
of human, financial, capital, physical, and natural resources to generate marketable goods and services” (Swager 1991, 3).
It is widely recognized that any definition of "economic development" must include "reduction of poverty" (Richards 2003).
Development economists and international institutions such as the World Bank define “Economic Development” as
“improvement in the quality of life” (e.g., Todaro 1994, pp. 14–19; World Bank 1991, p. 4; Sen 1981). It may thus be
achieved by transforming increased production into augmented quality-of-life variables, such as health and literacy, as well
as command over other utility-enhancing goods and services (Fosu 2004). Economic Development used in this paper is
similar “human development” defined by the United Nations (1990, 9–16). Following these definitions, ICT projects that
attack poverty or enhance women’s command over resources contribute more to economic development than projects that
have opposite characteristics.
RELEVANT THEORIES: INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS
All economic phenomena are arguably also institutional phenomena (Parto 2005). A corollary of this statement is that ICT
projects exhibit important institutional characteristics. For this reason, institutionalists have recognized that the success of an
innovation is tightly linked to the context provided by institutions in an economy (Storper and Walker 1989, Sabel and Zeitlin
1997). Viewing from a rational perspective, institutions are mechanisms that provide efficient solutions to predefined
problems (Olson 1965; Williamson 1975). Institutions do so by helping align individual and collective interests.
North (1990) defines institutions as the macro-level rules of the game and thus distinguishes the players (organizations) from
the rules (institutions) (p. 27). Institutions can be better understood in the context of the tasks for which they were created
(Holm 1995). For ICT projects, institutions guide behaviors of by mediating the relationships among various stakeholders
and technologies (Russo 2001)1.
In this article, we follow definitions of institutions suggested by Scott (1995, 2001)2. Scott has conceptualized institutions as
composed of three broad categories: regulatory, cognitive, and normative.
Regulative institutions
Regulative institutions consist of "explicit regulative processes: rule setting, monitoring, and sanctioning activities" (Scott
1995:35). They include regulatory bodies (such as the government of Andhra Pradesh) and the existing laws and rules (such
as local procurement and anti-monopoly laws in China) that influence the success of an ICT project. These institutions focus
on the pragmatic legitimacy concerns in managing the demands of regulators and governments (Kelman 1987).
Normative institutions
Normative components introduce "a prescriptive, evaluative, and obligatory dimension into social life" (Scott 1995, 37).
Practices that are consistent with and take into account the different assumptions and value systems of the national cultures
are likely to be successful (Schneider 1999). While regulative rules are parts of regulative institutions, social rules are
components of normative institutions. Normative institutions are concerned with procedural legitimacy and require users and
implementers of an ICT project to embrace socially accepted norms and behaviors (Selznick 1984).
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Cognitive Institutions
Although all components of institutions are intertwined with culture (Neale 1994:404), cognitive institutions are arguably
most closely associated with culture (Jepperson 1991). These components represent culturally supported habits that influence
the  success  of  an  ICT  projects.  In  most  cases,  they  are  associated  with  cognitive  legitimacy  concerns  that  are  based  on
subconsciously accepted rules and customs as well as some taken-for-granted cultural account of technology use (Berger and
Luckmann 1967). Cognitive programs affect the way people notice, categorize, and interpret stimuli.
Scott (1995, 40) suggests that "cognitive elements constitute the nature of reality and the frames through which meaning is
made". At this point, it must be emphasized that although carried by individual members, cognitive programs are elements of
the social environment and are thus social in nature (Berger and Luckman 1967). Various stakeholders of a project (e.g.,
people at different social classes, donor agencies, national and international policy makers, and media), however, have varied
cognitive programs that influence the lens through which they view an ICT project.
TWO CASES ILLUSTRATING ICT-INSTITUTIONS-DEVELOPMENT NEXUS
Table 3 presents regulative, normative and cognitive institutions that influenced the two projects selected in this paper.
Table 3 here
Case 1: IT development in the AP
Chandrababu Naidu, the chief minister of the Andhra Pradesh (AP) state of India during1995-2004, played an instrumental
role in the development of the high-tech industries in the state. During Naidu’s tenure as the AP chief minister, the state
attracted $12 billion foreign investment3. He attacked impediments to the growth of the IT industry measures and
computerized government machinery. AP emerged as Asia’s major IT hub as well as a significant producer and consumer of
IT in a very short period of time. The Hi-tech city at Hyderabad, the capital of AP, has Asia’s largest software technology
complex which houses Microsoft’s development facility and the operations of industry giants like Infosys, Oracle, Dell, GE
Capital, IBM, Motorola, Ericsson, Citicorp, Baan/Invensys and HSBC.
Many  technology services firms in Hyderabad serve customers in the U.S. and Europe. Many high skilled computer
programmers and software developers live and work in the rapidly modernizing city. Like the rest of India, however, farmers
living in villages account for 70% of the AP population (globalenvision.org 2004). The IT revolution in Hyderabad has a
very little impact on these farmers’ lives. On the contrary, consider the neighboring state, Maharashtra’s government-funded
Kisaan Call Center. The center provides rural farmers advice from operators speaking their own language treating every
farmer as a customer (globalenvision.org 2004). Many farmers in AP villages unable to cope with drought commit suicide.
Estimates suggest that AP accounts for 75% of suicide deaths in India4.
Regulative institutions
There are different levels of sanctioning and monitoring powers associated with various stakeholders. International agencies’
have rules affecting the behavior of individual economies. For instance, the World Bank offers loans only to economies that
undertake economic reforms. In the AP case, Naidu’s economic reforms drastically improved credit rating of the state. The
World Bank in 1998 provided $557 million for the AP Economic Restructuring Project even though assistance to India was
blocked after its nuclear tests.
Next, national/state level laws determine who benefits from an ICT project. Naidu’s government in AP, for instance, revised
laws against special privileges to the backward population. To take one example, in February 1999, AP government decided
that Indian Institute of Information Technology (IIIT) would not provide reservations for the Backward and Scheduled
classes and would strictly adhere to the admissions based on merit5.
The balance of sanctioning power associated with an ICT project may shift from one source to another over time.  Thanks to
the democratic system, ordinary citizens also have monitoring and sanctioning power in India. In the May 2004 election,
unhappy farmers exercised their sanctioning power and voted Naidu out of office.
Normative institutions
Governments in developing countries, however, have moral obligation to reduce poverty. Naidu’s opponents capitalized on
the fact that the ICT projects had virtually no impact on poverty reduction. They attacked Naidu’s decision to raise rice and
electricity prices by cutting subsidies as “anti-people” and branded as elitist his cultivation of technology and foreign capital
(Chanda 2000). The state’s low per capita income, dependence on agriculture, and an illiteracy rate in excess of 53%
reinforced the effects6.
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Cognitive institutions
In the early days Naidu’s plans gained very little cognitive legitimacy from stakeholders. There was a serious lack of belief
that his projects would lead to the economic development. One of Naidu’s interviews provides a glimpse of such disbelief:
I used to talk about Singapore, South Korea, even Japan. At that time people used to laugh at me. Even when I spoke
about Information Technology, people used to react very pessimistically (Lanka.net 2001).
Cognitive programs change over time but not at the same rate across different groups of stakeholders. The lens through which
government employees, farmers, development agencies, national and international policy saw the AP ICT changed at
different rates over time.
Initially, government bureaucrats perceived the ICT projects as threats to their jobs and incompatible with their daily
routines. The projects arguably jeopardized their jobs as well as the ability to extract bribes (The Economist 1999, September
11). They vigorously opposed Naidu’s IT plans and protested against computerization by threatening an indefinite strike in
1999.  Naidu, however, motivated bureaucrats to champion IT usage. Many bureaucrats were labeled as ex-officio IT
secretaries. The resistive force from the bureaucrats disappeared. They shared common platforms of views on IT issues, made
effective presentations and spoke the same language in public forums (Bhatnagar 1999).
Development agencies, international media and international policymakers had a positive cognitive evaluation of Naidu’s
plans. The President of the World Bank, while addressing the Governors of the bank mentioned AP’s initiatives. During his
India visit in 2000, U.S. President Bill Clinton visited Hyderabad, as the exemplar IT city of India, rather than the more
famous “software plateau” of Bangalore (Field 2000).
AP government responded to suggestions from investors at a pace that is startling by established standards of India (The
Pioneer 1998) and other developing countries. Such responsiveness influenced Bill Gates’ commitment of $80 million over
three years for a development center in Hyderabad in his Asia tour in 2000 (Business Asia 2000). It is reported that the AP
Government responded to some of the Microsoft’s demands within a single day, even though it was a holiday.
Economic elites that benefited from the ICT projects also provided cognitive legitimacy to his projects. A college lecturer
said:
We can see a big change in our lives since Naidu took over. Most politicians are corrupt, but at least this one works
(Quoted in Sidhva 1998).
A majority of the population depending upon agriculture, on the other hand, had persistent negative cognitive programs.
Naidu’s neglect of agriculture development and focus on the computer industry cost him the election in May 2004. Y S
Rajashekha Reddy, who replaced Naidu, said:
'We stand committed to their (the peoples') development, to mitigate their sufferings. Mr. Naidu only made five percent
of the population richer. We raised the farmers' issue in the assembly, and Naidu ignored it'.7
Contribution to economic development
While software exports from India registered 56% annual average growth rate in the period 1996 to 20008, AP was the only
state in India to register consistently triple digit growth rates during this period – a Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR)
of 121% (IT People 2001 August 27). Software exports from AP increased from US $1 million in 1992 to US $265 million in
1999.
The Naidu government, however, failed to transform increased production into improving the quality-of-life of rural people.
ICT projects in AP employed highly capital intensive technology which is incompatible with the relative abundance of labor
(Hawrylyshyn 1978).  Developments in technology and industrialization thus failed to bridge the urban-rural divide or attack
poverty and social and gender inequalities (Sen et al. 2002).
Case 2: OSS in China
No other developing countries are even close to the level of achievement China has achieved in the OSS arena. The Chinese
government started Linux development in 1998 and has thrown its weight behind the project since then.
Red Flag Linux was established in August 1999.  Beijing Software Industry Production Center was similarly a group
established by the government to organize Linux development. Red Flag, working with TurboLinux, first introduced
Chinese-language versions of Linux (Smith 2000). Building on RedFlag and Cosix Linux, and coordinating the efforts of a
hundred software engineers across 18 organizations, Yangfan Linux was launched by the center in the early 2002. It was
installed in 2,800 government computers in Beijing during the first six months.
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Regulative institutions
Rule setting, sanctioning and monitoring activities by Chinese government have provided regulative legitimacy to OSS.
Local procurement and anti-monopoly laws: The Government Procurement Law enacted in January 2003, requires
government departments to procure domestic goods and services where possible9 (Ebusinessforum.com 2004). The local
procurement requirement is thus giving a major boost to the growth of the Chinese OSS industry. Moreover, a report of the
Chinese State Administration for Industry and Commerce in the mid-2004 argued the urgency of the need of anti-monopoly
and anti-trust laws10. The report cited Microsoft's dominance on the Chinese software market.
Stricter piracy laws: Estimates suggest that over 92% of software used in China is pirated (Kessler 2004). As a WTO
member, China is compelled to adhere to the trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights (TRIPS) agreement. The
TRIPS agreement requires China to provide adequate legal and enforcement tools to prevent piracy.  Rapid growth in the
domestically developed IP has also provided impetuous to China’s fight against anti-piracy (Roth 2005). Under new laws,
buyers of pirated goods can be fined 5-10 times the value of the goods and manufacturers face jail time and equipment
confiscation (Kanellos 2002).
Government’s technology priority: Linux development was the only software project on a list of government's top technology
priorities in 1999. Similarly, Linux Internet server software and Linux mobile phone software were among the 19 projects
identified by The Ministry of Information Industry (MII) in 2004 for IT fund, which was founded by the State Council in
1986 to encourage R&D in IT11.
Normative institutions
The OSS projects have gained normative legitimacy from various constituencies in China.
National security concerns: For the PLA and the government maintaining national security falls on the obligatory dimension.
In an editorial on "information colonialism" in February 2000, the People's Liberation Army Daily wrote:
Without information security, there is no national security in politics, economics and military affairs. While learning
from others, China should not be under their control (Goad and Holland 2000).
An article published in China Economic Times on June 12, 2000 discussed military security as one of the three mechanisms
Xu Guanhua, then Chinese vice minister of the science and technology, thought high technology affects national security.
Guanhua said that developed countries have put many hi-tech arms into actual battles and discussed the likelihood that
technology-exporting countries might have installed software for “coercing, attacking or sabotage”. In particular, Chinese
government thinks that Microsoft and the U.S. government spy on Chinese computer users through secret "back doors" in
Microsoft products (Mahlow 2003).
Principal of self reliance and national pride: Fear about dependence on foreign country combined with a sense of national
pride12 resulted in the principle of national self-reliance under the Mao Tse Tung era (Terrill 1977). Since then, this principle
has been guiding the Chinese economic system. Though attitude toward technology import and foreign investment has
changed drastically, due to a lack of significant alteration in its political structure (Solinger 1995, p.127), a high level of
advocacy for national self-reliance and domestic development of technology still exists among Chinese policy makers,
researchers and scientists (Simon 2001) and more so among military leaders.
The foreign software used in China’s computers has thus long been a focus of concerns. Over the past 20 years, China made
several attempts to develop a Chinese operating system, but failed because of the fast development of the global software
industry (Goad and Holland 2000). Chinese scientists and engineers are working to create Chinese standards in computer
operating systems and audio-video compression to 3G data standards (CNETAsia 2003). They want to achieve self reliance
and reverse the flow of fees13 by exporting Chinese standards. There is also the matter of national pride in having a custom-
made operating system.
Cognitive institutions
Culturally supported habits and subconsciously accepted rules and customs in China are compatible with OSS.
Perception of exploitation by foreign MNCs: Although a large proportion of Chinese users do not pay for software, thanks
mainly to widespread piracy, those who pay feel that license fees of Microsoft and other multinational corporations (MNCs)
are expensive.  For instance, Microsoft Windows 98’s price of US$241 translates to four months' salary for an average
Chinese worker. An Internet entrepreneur even sued Microsoft for unfair pricing (Smith 2000).
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Attitude toward sharing: A distinguishing feature of OSS is that unlike proprietary software, it can be “legally” shared. China
and the Western world differ in terms of attitude toward software sharing.
Gallaway and Kinnear (2004) argue that the contemporary cognitive institutions in Western countries do not encourage
sharing. Confucianism, which has had a strong influence on the Chinese politics and culture, on the other hand, emphasizes
the importance of the family and society over the rights of the individual person (Hofstede and Bond 1988).
Second, in terms of the perception of how innovations originate, Chinese differ drastically from Westerners. Intellectual
property (IP) protection in Europe and the U.S. is based on the premises that an individual can create and own ideas
(Mittelstaedt and Mittelstaedt 1997). Alford (1995, p. 25) argues that the disagreement of Confucianism with the Western
concepts explains the difference in the systems of copyrights and attitudes towards piracy.
Contribution to economic development
OSS is rapidly diffusing in China. The number of companies involved in developing Linux in China as well as providing
software and services for Chinese Linux users is increasing rapidly. In the second half of 2003 alone, Linux sales in the
Chinese PC market crossed 800,000 copies14, a big saving in IP royalty. In June 2004, a Chinese-made super computer
"Dawning 4000A", which is based on a Linux operating system, ranked Number 10 in the top 500 list of the world's fastest
supercomputers15.
LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE TWO CASES
In this section, we explain the “whys” of the ICTs-Institutions-Economic development nexus discussed in the above two
cases. The following are some of the important lessons we have learned from the two cases:
1. ICT diffusion pattern is a function of the cohesiveness of institutional components.
The success of an ICT project depends on the extent to which all components of institutions work cohesively together toward
a common mission. OSS projects in China, for instance, have gained regulative, normative and cognitive legitimacy over
competing products (e.g., Microsoft). There are thus no difficulties related to institutional adjustment for OSS in China.
Chinese policy makers created institutional structure or rules of game (such as MII’s allocation of IT funds for OSS projects
and local procurement laws) to facilitate OSS projects. These structures were consistent with Chinese cultural institutions (or
in Scott’s terms: normative and cognitive institutions) such as principle of self-reliance and habits of sharing. Put differently,
rather than “slavishly imitating Western institutions” (North 2005), Chinese attempted to create institutions that are
compatible with OSS and are derived from their cultural institutions.
2. An ICT project that ignores socially disadvantaged groups is like a house constructed on a sand foundation.
In a developing country with widespread poverty, when people have direct sanctioning power, the projects that are elite
centered are likely to fail. The AP case discussed in this paper reinforces the observation made by the World Bank’s Charles
Kenny: "Poor people don't seem to think that the Internet is the answer to all their problems" (Rich 2003, p. 93). Institutions
help individuals understand what may and may not be done (Neale 1994, 403). In countries that have widespread poverty,
policy makers may not launch ICT projects that are economic elite centered.  In the AP case, for instance, national and
international media and policy makers provided legitimacy to Naidu’s ICT projects. Without support from grass-root people,
however, they became like a house constructed on a sand foundation.
3. Institution-ICT linkage also depends upon the current level of economic development and market size
An inter-case comparison indicates that level of economic development and market size moderate the institution-ICT-
economic development nexus. For instance, since the Chinese market is bigger and more developed than that of AP (or
India), foreign investors are more likely to be attracted even without any institutional adjustments. Whereas AP was required
to carry out reforms and undergo significant institutional adjustments in line with the ICT projects to attract foreign investors
in the state, many foreign investors continue to be gravitated to China even without significant institutional changes.
Moreover, China’s stage of IT development allows it to develop its own technology (such as OSS), but AP is at more
primitive stages.  Furthermore, habit of software sharing, one of the major sources of success of OSS, is related to the level of
IT industry development. The development level of IT industry is negatively related to propensity to share.
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DISCUSSION, IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION
The cases analyzed in this paper make it clear that institutions are the real root causes of success or failure of ICT projects.
Sanctioning and monitoring power, social norms and cognitive programs of various stakeholders play instrumental roles to
determine the contribution of an ICT project to economic development.
OSS experience in China indicates that ICT projects that gain regulative, normative and cognitive legitimacy over competing
products (e.g., Microsoft) diffuse rapidly. The AP case, on the other hand, indicates that ICT projects that are incompatible
with social norms (normative institutions) and perceived to be top-down (cognitive institutions) face an array of barriers, at
least in the long run. In developing countries, when people have direct sanctioning power, the projects that focus on the elites
are likely to fail.
In some cases, different stakeholder groups have contradictory preferences. In the AP case, for instance, increased rice and
electricity prices fostered positive cognitive effects to lending agencies such as the World Bank but was against the implicit
obligation of reducing poverty.
The discussions in this paper are, however, tempered by some limitations. These include exploratory nature of the
research and a lack of inferential statistics. These limitations indicate the need for further research in this area. Particularly
fruitful avenues include developing and testing quantitative model that combines the effect of the regulative, normative, and
cognitive factors.
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Table 1: A comparison of the two ICT projects in terms of major characteristics
AP OSS in China
Main beneficiaries  IT educated population General population
Focus on export
vs. consumption
Export Export and consumption
Sponsor Government Government
Level of skills High Low/high
Capital required   High Low/high
Geographic focus Hyderabad (the capital city:
urban area)
National
Table 2: A comparison of economic and socio-cultural indicators of India and China
India China
Per capita GDP - $ 2002 487 989
Per capita GDP (PPP) - $ 2002 2670 4580
Males’ per capita GDP (PPP $)
2002
3820 5435
Females’ per capita GDP (PPP $)
2002
1442 3571
Females’ GDP as a percentage of
males’ GDP
0.38 0.66
Composition of economic activities
Female (adult) literacy rate (% ages
15 and above) 2002
46.4 86.5
Male (adult) literacy rate (% ages 15
and above) 2002
69.0 95.1
Overall (adult) literacy rate (% ages
15 and above) 2002
62.3 90.9
Internet users per 1,000 people 2002 15.9 46
Main telephone per 1,000 people
2002
40 167
Cellular telephone per 1,000 people
2002
12 161
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Table 3: Institutional legitimacy and ICT-Economic Development Nexus: A comparison of three cases
Institutional
pillar
ICT projects in AP OSS in China
Regulative o Democratic system in India: people's
sanctioning power over the project.
o World Bank: sanctions loans to economies that
carry out economic reforms.
o Naidu’s government: enacted rules against
reservation to backward classes.
o Local procurement and anti-monopoly laws
o Strict piracy laws
o Government’s technology priority
Normative o Higher marriage market value of male IT
graduates
o Government: moral obligation to reduce
poverty
o National security concerns
o Principal of self reliance and national pride
Cognitive o Bureaucrats: ICT perceived threats to job and
against their habit
o Farmers: Viewed as elitist development model
o Development agencies and foreign
governments: perceived successful ICT model
o Upper social class:  IT services beyond
expectation
o Foreign investors: high velocity of decision
making
o Perception of exploitation by foreign MNCs
o Attitude toward software sharing
Endnotes
1 Although Russo’s assertion is based on a narrow definition of institution, we argue that it can be extended to include the
cognitive component not included in his definition.
2 Hodgson (2003) has defined institutions along similar lines.
3 See “Naidu: India's leading reformer,” Rediff Business Desk, May 12, 2004,
http://us.rediff.com/money/2004/may/12spec.htm.
4 http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/india/2004/india-040513-rferl01.htm
5 The policy of reservation of export-oriented sectors arguably resulted in slow growth of this sector in the Indian economy
(Henley 2004).
6 Indian journalist Lionel Messias points out: "Government officials do not hesitate to point out that with IT gaining
precedence over all other sectors in [Andhra Pradesh Chief Minister Chandrababu] Naidu's scheme of things, little attention
is being paid to agriculture, the main and proven base of [Andhra Pradesh's] economy" (Quoted from Malhotra 2001).
7 http://www.indian-elections.com/latest-news/india-elections-news237.html .
8 Because the fiscal year ends in March, government statistics in India are reported in overlapping year formats. Thus, the
reported end points of this period are 1996-97 and 2000-01. we have simplified the dating system throughout by using the
first of the hyphenated calendar years.
9 Also see http://www.perkinscoie.com/page.cfm?id=534.
10 Also see, China Briefing, Far Eastern Economic Rev. 167 (July 15), 28.
11 See, MII Unveiled 19 Government-Sponsored IT Projects. SinoCast China Business Daily News. (July 19, 2004) 1.
12 In China, the state arguably bolsters its legitimacy through invoking a deep sense of "Chineseness" among citizens (Ong
1997; Barme 1999; Hansen 1999). This factors has strengthened the orientation towards domestically manufactured products.
13 For instance, China is the world's largest maker of DVD players. Adopting its own technology, it can save $2 billion a year
in royalties being paid to an 18-company consortium (Calbreath 2004).
14 See SinoCast China Business Daily News, August 4, 2004.
15 See “List for June 2004” at http://www.top500.org/list/2004/06
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